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BANKRUPTCY-CREDITOR'S RIGHT AGAINST ENTIRETY PROPERTY-APPLICABILITY OF STATE LAw WHEN UNITED STATES Is PLAINTIFF-The United
States as assignee sought a joint judgment on four unsecured promissory
notes signed by the defendants, who are husband and wife. The proceeds of
the notes were used to improve real property held by the entireties by the
defendants. The husband had filed in bankruptcy before the assignment of
the notes to plaintiff and was discharged from his joint and several liability
on the promissory notes prior to the commencement of any action on them.
His estate by the entireties, however, was not used to satisfy any listed debts
because under state law he had no divisible title which could pass to the
trustee in bankruptcy.1 The federal district court entered judgment for the
plaintiff.2 On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, held,
judgment set aside and case remanded with instructions to dismiss. Since
federal courts are not bound to apply state law when the United States is
plaintiff, the husband's liability on the notes was discharged in bankruptcy
and his release likewise precluded recovery from his wife. Fetter v. United
States, (6th Cir. 1959) 269 F. (2d) 467.
The court in the principal case stated that merely because the United
States was plaintiff3 it was not bound by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins4

1 In re Berry, (E.D. Mich. 1917) 247 F. 700. See McMullen v. Zabawski, (E.D. Mich.
1922) 283 F. 552. For a general discussion of the rules governing the relationship of
creditors to their debtors' entireties property in Michigan, see Bienenfeld, "Creditors v.
Tenancies by the Entirety," I WAYNE L. R.Ev. 105 (1955).
2 United States v. Fetter and Fetter, (E.D. Mich. 1958) 163 F. Supp. 10. For a discussion
of the district court decision, see note, 57 M1cH. L. REv. 607 (1959).
3 Jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. (1958) §1345.
4304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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to apply state law.5 The court expressly stated that had the suit been
brought by the original creditor it would have been bound to apply Michigan law which allowed recovery on the notes notwithstanding the husband's discharge in bankruptcy.6 Although it is frequently stated that the
Erie doctrine has no application where jurisdiction is not based on diversity of citizenship, this in not completely accurate; rather, the applicability of the Erie doctrine depends upon whether a local issue, as con-.
trasted with a federal issue, is before the court.7 In determining whether an
issue is federal or local it is more meaningful to talk in terms of the source
of the right involved, rather than the source of the jurisdiction of the court.s
Since the Erie decision, the Supreme Court has regularly decided that federal courts are not bound by state law when the United States sues because
the subject matter is invariably governed by the Constitution, thus raising a federal issue.9 This is so even when the United States sues as a
private party, although the issue raised is not expressly related to a federal statute or the Constitution.10 The need to be free to develop uniform
rules of law in certain areas of government operation has apparently led to
this result.1 1 The language used by the Supreme Court is broad enough to
include instances, as in the principal case, where the United States is merely
an assignee; 12 nevertheless, the actual holdings of the Supreme Court do not
necessarily warrant the inference that the Erie doctrine will not apply in
cases where the United States is merely an assignee.1 3 In the principal case
5 Principal case at 470. For a general discussion of the applicability of the Erie doctrine, see Gorrell and Weed, "Erie Railroad: Ten Years After," 9 Omo ST. L.J. 276 (1948).
6 Principal case at 470.
7 See 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 2d ed., §0.305 (3) (1959). See also Newman, "The
Federal Common Law," 26 DICTA 303 (1949); Snepp, "The Law Applied in the Federal
Courts," 13 LAw AND CONTEM. PROB. 165 at 168-169 (1948).
s Puerto Rico v. Russel & Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933); Gully v. First Nat. Bank, 299 U.S.
109 (1936). See also London," 'Federal Question' Jurisdiction-A Snare and a Delusion,"
57 M1CH. L. REv. 835 (1959). See, generally, note 7 supra.
9 Board of Commrs. v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939); Royal Indemnity Co. v.
United States, 313 U.S. 289 (1941); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363
(1943); United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174 (1944); United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
10 United States v. Standard Oil Co., note 9 supra. In cases where no legislative or
constitutional guide is available "it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule
of law according to their own standards." Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, note 9
supra, at 367. But see the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. (1958) §1652, which requires
that state law be applied " . . . except where the Constitution or treaties of the United
States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide. . ••" See also comment, 53 CoL.
L. REv. 991 (1953).
11 See note 9 supra.
12 In United States v. County of Allegheny, note 9 supra, at 182, the Court pointed out:
"Every acquisition, holding or disposition of property by the Federal Government depends
upon proper exercise of a constitutional grant of power."
13 In United States v. Standard Oil Co., note 9 supra, at 309, the Court in dicta stated
that federal courts may be bound by the Erie doctrine to apply state law " .•. where the
government has simply substituted itself for others as successor to rights governed by state
law. . . ." Steingut v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, (2d Cir. 1947) 161 F. (2d) 571
expressly recognized the distinction between the United States in its own rights and a
suit by the United States as assignee, distinguishing Supreme Court cases on this basis.
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the rights of the United States as assignee of the original creditor were
dependent upon the rights created by the contract made between the original creditor and the defendants. The rights of the creditor were admittedly governed by state law because, although the husband was discharged of
his joint and several liabilities in federal bankruptcy proceedings, interpretation of the effect of discharge in these circumstances has been left to the
state courts.14 Thus, to argue that the claims of the United States were
ultimately derived from federal law,15 merely because it had authority
under the Constitution to enter into such transactions, seems quite tenuous.
Even assuming that the application of state law is not compelled, the Supreme Court has recognized that it is often the appropriate law to follow
where there is no federal statute from which an overriding federal policy
could be derived or where there is no need for uniformity throughout the
country.16 The principal case in holding that it was not bound by state law
did not discuss its possible appropriateness.17 Yet state law would seem to be
particularly appropriate in this case for two reasons. First, in reaching its decision in the principal case the court was forced to look to two factors
controlled by state law, the married woman statutes and the unique estate
of tenancy by the entireties.is Having relied on state law to this extent,
it seems to follow that the court should go one step farther and apply
state law entirely. Secondly, whenever the United States is merely an assignee, in absence of clear federal policy to the contrary, state law should
be adopted because otherwise rights and liabilities of prior parties might
be unforeseeably altered by the unilateral act of one party who assigns his
interest.
James Cripe

14 Recognition of this fact is implicit in the court's reasoning in the principal case at
470 that under Michigan law a discharge in bankruptcy does not preclude a joint judgment. See also note, 57 MICH. L. REv. 607 (1959).
15 The holding in the principal case that under federal law a discharge in bankruptcy
of the husband precludes a judgment against the wife seems difficult to reconcile with the
rather express langnage of §34 of the Bankruptcy Act, which provides: "The liability of a
person who is a co-debtor with, or guarantor or in any manner a surety for, a bankrupt
shall not be altered by the discharge of such bankrupt." 30 Stat. 550 (1898), 11 U.S.C.
(1958) §34.
16 United States v. Standard Oil Co., note 9 supra, at 308-309; Royal Indemnity Co. v.
United States, note 9 supra, at 297. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, note 9 supra,
at 367.
17 Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. United Distillers Products Corp., (2d Cir. 1956)
229 F. (2d) 665, was relied on by the court in the principal case as authority for holding
that state law was not binding. But in that case it was also held that state law, though not
binding, was appropriate.
18 Principal case at 468-469.

